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Abstract
For many years, professional baseball has enjoyed a privileged antitrust exemption apart
from other professional sports. With the passing of the Curt Flood Act in 1998 this
exemption was removed; however, the act may not be as influential as it seems. Court
rulings were prominent in initiating and maintaining the antitrust exemption for
professional baseball. These include the Supreme Court Trilogy, especially the case of
Curt Flood, a baseball player who fought against the reserve clause system which limited
his and other players’ employment options. Collective bargaining as well as arbitration
became dominant in professional baseball labor relations under the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board and the National Labor Relations Act. Although the
collective bargaining process in Major League Baseball has been contentious, it provided
more bargaining power to the players, resulting in the elimination of many unfair labor
practices including the reserve system. The Curt Flood Act of 1998, which allows
professional Major League Baseball players to file lawsuits under antitrust regulations,
served as the final step in equalizing the power between players and owners. Early
predictions about the act concluded that it would either help strengthen baseball’s
antitrust exemption or harm the collective bargaining process. Other researchers thought
that the act would not have much of an effect at all because of its limitations and
requirements. But others have noted some positive results, specifically in labor
negotiations between players and owners, which point to the act having a genuine
influence on Major League Baseball.
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Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption and the Impact of the Curt Flood Act
Antitrust Laws and Baseball’s Unique Exemption
Labor relations in professional sports have long been characterized by control of
the teams and owners over employed athletes, restricting their ability to determine the
teams for which they would play as well as the amount of payment they would receive.
Two specific areas which have been most prominent in limiting a player’s employment
options are the player draft system and the reserve clause system. The draft limits the
players’ abilities to determine which team they will work for when starting their
professional careers, while the reserve clause system restricted the players’ continued
employment options once they were already in a sports league. Both of these situations
made the players essentially the property of their team and left their futures up to the
determination of the team for which they played. The ultimate issue with these systems
is that the policies which favored the owners were being established and upheld by the
owners, giving the players no way in which to have their interests addressed (Gilroy &
Madden, 1977).
For many years professional baseball has been an especially egregious infringer
of players’ rights, enjoying a privileged antitrust exemption unlike other professional
sports. This antitrust exemption meant that professional baseball players, or anyone else
who had cause, could not file a lawsuit against Major League Baseball (MLB) under
antitrust laws (Gilroy & Madden, 1977). Antitrust laws usually refer to the original
legislation passed in 1890 known as the Sherman Act, which prevents companies from
monopolizing trade in their industry and prohibits conspiracies intended to restrain trade
or commerce (Bautista, 2000). The act was vague in that the language used did not
provide enough details for it to be taken at face value. For example, the act outlawed
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every contract that restrains trade, which could be taken to mean every contract in
existence, since a contract necessarily limits the parties involved to only dealing with
each other. By wording the Sherman Act in this way, Congress in effect left the
interpretation of the act and its scope to the judicial branch (Alito, 2009).
Confusion about the applications of the law as well as a landmark ruling
concluding that unions can be found guilty of conspiring to restrict trade caused Congress
to enact exemptions to the Sherman Act in order to protect the collective bargaining
process from antitrust laws. These pieces of legislation include the Clayton Act of 1914,
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which
collectively not only resulted in labor being exempt from the Sherman Act, but also
created policies and guidelines encouraging bargaining between organized labor groups
and management. Other non-statutory exemptions have come through several rulings by
the Supreme Court, including the United Mine Workers v. Pennington case, reaffirming
the protection of the agreements created through collective bargaining negotiations from
antitrust laws (Bautista, 2000).
Baseball’s antitrust exemption has been a crucial contributing factor in hindering
baseball players’ abilities to determine their own employment situations and in allowing
the reserve clause system and other unfair labor practices to persevere through baseball’s
extensive history (Gilroy & Madden, 1977). With the passing of the Curt Flood Act in
1998, the application of this antitrust exemption to labor relations in MLB was limited.
The act did not completely remove the exemption, but instead allowed current MLB
players to file lawsuits against MLB regarding matters of their employment under
antitrust laws. However, the ultimate impact of the act on the interactions between MLB
players and owners, especially as seen in the process of reaching collective bargaining
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agreements, is not easily discerned (Grow, 2009). Three different opinions about the
ultimate impact of the act have emerged as a result of careful evaluation of labor relations
in MLB in the years since 1998. These theories include that the act has had a positive
effect on recent negotiations between baseball players and owners; that the rigorous
procedures to enforce the act are too complicated to be useful; and that because of the
impact of collective bargaining the act is ineffective (Bautista, 2000; Grow, 2009; Grow,
2012).
History of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
No legislation specifically addressed whether or not MLB possessed an
exemption from antitrust laws before the passing of the Curt Flood Act in 1998. Instead,
court rulings were instrumental in initiating and maintaining the antitrust exemption for
professional baseball. Three cases known as the “Supreme Court Trilogy” are crucial to
fully understanding the antitrust exemption afforded to MLB: the Federal Baseball case,
the Toolson case, and Flood v. Kuhn (Wolohan, 1999).
Predecessor to the Trilogy
Prior to and influential in the ruling of the Federal Baseball case was the case of
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase ruling. In June of 1914, a baseball
player for the Chicago White Sox of the American League of Baseball named Harold H.
Chase was already under contract to play for the Sox when he decided to leave them and
instead play in the newly formed Federal Baseball League with their Buffalo Club.
Chicago attempted to prevent the move by seeking a court injunction since Chase’s
contract was subject to the National Agreement (Wolohan, 1999).
Earlier, in 1901, the American League of Baseball had been established and began
to present a formidable threat to the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
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which had already been in existence for 25 years. After initially competing with each
other for players, both leagues signed a contract in 1903 known as the National
Agreement, assuring that the two leagues would be treated equally and would honor the
other league’s player contracts. But the agreement also included a promise that both
leagues would observe the reserve clause which, along with other rules put forth in the
agreement, set in place the foundation for what labor relations in professional baseball
would be like for nearly 100 years (Alito, 2009).
In the case of Chicago v. Chase, the courts decided to refuse the White Sox’
injunction on the basis that the contract and its reserve clause were unenforceable
because of a lack of mutuality. The courts recognized that the contract lacked equal
obligation and remedy by both parties, as seen in the sole ability of the team to decide
whether to terminate the contract or retain the player for the year following the contract’s
expiration. This ruling did two things for labor relations in baseball. First, it set the
precedent for the courts in not granting injunctions to baseball teams based on the player
contract, because such a contract was not enforceable. But it also set the stage for
controversy over whether these contracts violated antitrust laws because the courts
acknowledged the unfair qualities of the reserve clause system (Wolohan, 1999).
After the ruling about the injunction was decided, the court began to further
examine the actual reserve clause found in the contract as a result of the National
Agreement to determine if it violated the newly enacted Sherman Act. The courts
determined that although organized baseball had created a monopoly within the United
States and their agreement between the National and American leagues was clearly in
violation of antitrust law, baseball did not constitute interstate trade or commerce.
Instead the courts labeled professional baseball as a mere sport or game that did not fall
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under the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act (Wolohan, 1999). Despite this ruling, the court
clearly disapproved of the involuntary nature of baseball’s contracts stating that the
stronghold that organized baseball held on the players was “so great as to make it
necessary for the player either to take the contract prescribed by the commission or
abandon baseball as a profession” (as cited in Wolohan, 1999, p. 351).
Federal Baseball
The first part of the trilogy of non-statutory regulations that formed what is
known as professional baseball’s antitrust exemption was the 1922 U.S. Supreme Court
ruling in the case of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. the National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs (Wolohan, 1999). A new league of professional baseball,
the Federal League, formed in 1913 and soon grew to rival the National and American
Leagues, competing for spectators and players and quickly becoming successful.
However, after only two years of competition, financial struggles forced the league to
reach a peace agreement with organized baseball which dissolved the Federal League and
therefore all of its member clubs (Alito, 2009). The agreement only made provisions for
two of the Federal League owners to buy into existing Professional Baseball teams and
some of the players’ contracts to be auctioned off to National League teams. This left
most of the clubs, including the one in Baltimore, with virtually no options other than to
fold and dissolve as well (Wolohan, 1999). In reaction to the ruin of its organization, the
Baltimore franchise filed an antitrust lawsuit against everyone that could be linked with
the monopoly on baseball including both leagues, all of their teams, their current
presidents, the National Commission president, the former league president, and the two
owners who were able to join ties with current league teams (Alito, 2009).

BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION

9

Baltimore’s claim that the leagues acted in violation of antitrust laws in ways that
caused damages to the Baltimore club was initially agreed with by the District of
Columbia Supreme Court in 1917, who awarded the club $240,000 in damages as well as
its attorney fees. But that ruling was subsequently overturned by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which cited the Chase case from 1914 in defense of its
ruling that baseball was not commerce or trade. According to the definitions of the words
trade and commerce in Webster’s Dictionary that the court used, the business of baseball
did not include the necessary transfer of something such as people or goods. The court
concluded that the players and equipment which did move between states for exhibitions
were incidental to the game and separate from the actual products being sold which are
the baseball games (Alito, 2009). The court noted that the providing of baseball
exhibitions is “local in its beginning and in its end” (as cited in Wolohan, 1999, p. 353).
The implications of these decisions were that the reserve clause and the actions of the
leagues did not fall under the regulations of antitrust laws because they were related to
the movement of the players and not the actual product, which in this case was the
baseball games (Alito, 2009).
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Baltimore club appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court where the counsel for the defense added to the argument by saying that in order for
baseball to even exist at all, it depended on being free from antitrust regulations (Abrams,
1999; Alito, 2009). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., reviewed the Supreme Court’s
decision and provided the unanimous opinion for the court in 1922. In his very brief
analysis that consisted of only two paragraphs, Justice Holmes, much like the D.C. Court
of Appeals, focused on whether organized baseball itself fell under the regulations of the
Sherman Act instead of whether the particular actions of the defendants were in violation
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of antitrust laws. His analysis of the question of the business of baseball being interstate
commerce centered on the idea that the nature of baseball was an intrastate affair, despite
the necessity of players crossing city and state borders (Alito, 2009). The Supreme Court
agreed with the D.C. Court’s decision, holding that the business of baseball was not
subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act (Wolohan, 1999).
Despite many challenges and questions of its legitimacy, this ruling would survive
for the next seventy-six years until the Curt Flood Act was passed in 1998. The first test
of the decision came before the next case in the Trilogy in the form of Gardella v.
Chandler (Wolohan, 1999). This case involved a player who was under contract to play
for the New York Giants club for the 1946 season, but instead signed on to a Mexican
league for one year before that league fell apart (Gallant & Staudohar, 2003). However,
upon his return to the United States he discovered that organized baseball had blacklisted
him and he could no longer play baseball for any team. The commissioner at the time,
Albert B. Chandler, had put in place a rule banning any player who moved to the
Mexican League from professional baseball. Gardella decided to challenge his banning
and in effect the reserve clause and the Supreme Court ruling in the Federal Baseball case
by suing organized baseball (Wolohan, 1999).
After the case was appealed to the Second Circuit Court in New York, the court
purported that the addition of radio and television broadcasting of baseball games
changed the nature of professional baseball to interstate commerce. This meant that the
case had the necessary legitimacy that was said to be lacking in Federal Baseball to
warrant proceeding with the trial. In his comments about the New York court’s two to
one decision, Judge Frank claimed that the recent rulings of the Supreme Court made the
Federal Baseball case outdated and no longer of any relevance. The entire court also
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showed an extreme disgust with baseball’s reserve clause which they said “results in
something resembling peonage of the baseball player” (Wolohan, 1999, p. 355).
Although the monopoly of organized baseball appeared to finally have been
seriously challenged, the NY court realized that they did not have the authority to
overturn a Supreme Court ruling. Despite these initial promising opinions, the case was
never heard after it was sent back to the Federal District Court of New York because
professional baseball had settled out of court with Gardella by reinstating him into the
league and offering him a sum of $60,000. The case served as a serious scare for
organized baseball, but after all the proceedings had ended baseball’s antitrust exemption
still stood (Gallant and Staudohar, 2003).
Toolson v. New York Yankees
The next case in baseball’s antitrust exemption trilogy is that of Toolson v. New
York Yankees. George Toolson was a minor league pitcher under contract to play for his
parent club, the New York Yankees (Wolohan, 1999). Since the Yankees had more
pitching talent than they needed, Toolson was asked to transfer to a lower level of minor
league play, which would have seriously hampered his career when instead he needed to
be advancing it. When the Yankees decided to utilize the reserve clause in Toolson’s
contract and prevent him from signing with another major league team, Toolson did not
report to the team’s minor league affiliate (Gallant and Staudohar, 2003). In an attempt
to free himself from the Yankees while continuing to pursue a career in Major League
Baseball, Toolson filed an antitrust lawsuit against the Yankees in 1952 (Abrams, 1999).
By this time, baseball’s antitrust exemption had become an established principle in the
courts, and once this case made its way to the Supreme Court it would be the first
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opportunity for the judges to correct the exemption from the ruling in Federal Baseball
(Gallant and Staudohar, 2003).
But the Supreme Court determined in a one page decision that the ruling in
Federal Baseball would remain and that the exemption for Major League Baseball would
not be removed by the courts (Wolohan, 1999). The court cited not only the original case
in 1922 for its reasoning, but also the fact that in the 30 years following the verdict
Congress had not acted against the decision. Not only that, but Congress’s inaction had
allowed baseball, and specifically the reserve clause system, to continue to grow under
the understanding that it was protected from existing antitrust laws (Abrams, 1999;
Gallant and Staudohar, 2003). This decision was particularly interesting given that just
prior to the case a subcommittee of the House of Representatives had concluded a hearing
on the baseball industry, particularly the reserve system and baseball’s antitrust
exemption. In that hearing, Congress determined to take no action in reference to the
antitrust exemption since it was assured that any error the Supreme Court might have
initially committed in the Federal Baseball case would be corrected in the upcoming
Toolson case (Abrams, 1999).
Although the verdict was the same for Toolson as it was for Federal Baseball, this
time the decision was not unanimous. Justice Burton was one of the judges who argued
for the opposition. Much like the courts in the Gardella case had determined, Justice
Burton thought that it was impossible to deny that baseball had changed enough since
1922 to make the declaration that professional baseball was not interstate trade or
commerce inapplicable. Justice Burton also thought that only Congress should have the
right to determine what businesses would be exempt from the Sherman Act and they had
failed to pass any legislature granting baseball or any other professional sport this kind of
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immunity. Despite these reasons, the Supreme Court made its decision to maintain the
Federal Baseball ruling and in doing so, determined that the legislative rather than the
judicial branch would have to be responsible for changing the antitrust exemption
originally granted in 1922, if it were to ever change at all (Wolohan, 1999).
Flood v. Kuhn
The final and probably most influential case in regards to the preservation of
baseball’s antitrust exemption was the Flood v. Kuhn case. The plaintiff, Curt Flood, was
a baseball player for the St. Louis Cardinals who had played at an all-star level, leading
his team as a centerfielder to three pennants in the 1960s. He had also been a highly
regarded member of his community and well respected by his teammates and coaches for
12 years (Abrams, 1999). Then in 1969, the Cardinals traded Flood to the Philadelphia
Phillies, without involving Flood in the decision or even informing him of the move until
it was already completed. Flood did not want to be traded and wrote a complaint to
MLB’s Commissioner, Bowie Kuhn, asking to be declared a free agent so that he could
talk with other MLB teams about playing for them (Gallant and Staudohar, 2003). He
made his intent clear: that the issue was not about money or location, but his right to
choose his employer and not be subjected to a reserve system that felt like a form of
involuntary servitude (Mathewson, 1999).
The Commissioner refused to go against the Cardinals’ decision, which Flood
approached as a question of civil rights, prompting Flood to file a lawsuit against the
Commissioner, the two league presidents, and 24 MLB teams in 1970 (Abrams, 1999;
Bautista, 2000). Flood’s lawsuit claimed that MLB and their reserve clause system,
which could force him to leave his profession of baseball if he did not comply with his
team’s wishes, were in violation of Federal and state antitrust regulations. Flood also
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brought a new accusation against MLB when he added that the monopolization of
baseball infringed on his 13th Amendment civil rights against involuntary servitude
(Abrams, 1999; Gallant and Staudohar, 2003). After the District Court and Second
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Flood’s claims on the grounds of the previous Federal
Baseball and Toolson rulings, the case reached the Supreme Court once again. This time
the plaintiff had the backing of the MLB Players’ Association and former Supreme Court
Justice Arthur Goldberg. Almost 50 years after the original Federal Baseball case, the
court was presented with yet another chance to remove baseball’s antiquated antitrust
exemption (Abrams, 1999).
But the Supreme Court came to the same conclusion as it had in the past, in a five
to three decision, that professional baseball would still have a unique exemption from
antitrust laws to continue its reserve system (Gilroy & Madden, 1977). This time the
court also examined the history of baseball and listened to some baseball players who
talked about the reserve system before reaching its decision. In his second year on the
Supreme Court, Justice Harry Blackmun provided the controversial decision (Abrams,
1999). The court determined that the antitrust exemption was an established aberration
that catered to baseball’s unique attributes and constraints necessary in order to sustain
the game (Abrams, 1999; Bautista, 2000; Gallant & Staudohar, 2003). Although the
court agreed that the exemption was an “anomaly” and that baseball now undoubtedly
engaged in interstate commerce, it determined that organized baseball should be allowed
to keep its exemption because of the years of history during which baseball operated
under its protection without judicial or legislative interference (Bautista, 2000; Gallant &
Staudohar, 2003). According to Justice Blackmun, the principle of stare decisis applied
in this case and, once again, if anything was to change then it would have to occur by
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Congress’s determination rather than the courts (Abrams, 1999; Champion, 2009; Gallant
& Staudohar, 2003).
Providing the opinion for the dissent in the case was Justice Douglas who made
the point that if this case were being examined for the first time without any prior history,
then the opinion would be undoubtedly in favor of Curt Flood. There would be no
question as to whether baseball should be exempt from antitrust laws since baseball was
clearly a trade involved in interstate commerce. Justice Douglas also argued that
Congress’ inactivity did not mean that the Supreme Court should not attempt to correct
its mistake regarding baseball’s original antitrust exemption. The inactivity of the
legislative branch that the court’s decision relied upon was neither in favor of the
exemption nor in opposition to it, Justice Douglas proposed, since Congress had not
passed any laws providing professional baseball with a unique exemption either. But
these arguments were the minority opinion in the vote and baseball’s antitrust exemption
was maintained once again (Wolohan, 1999).
Following this ruling, the only challenges to baseball’s antitrust exemption in
court occurred in regards to its scope. In the case of Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn in
1978, the owner of the Oakland Athletics baseball team, Charles Finley, decided to sue
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn for refusing to allow the sale of three Athletics players.
Finley argued that baseball was exempt from antitrust laws in regards to only the reserve
clause system rather the entire business of baseball. The courts determined otherwise,
ruling that any aspect of professional baseball was intended to be protected from antitrust
laws in the Flood case. A similar ruling was also given in the case of Professional
Baseball School & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn in 1982 where the plaintiff argued that the player
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assignment system, franchise location system, and league rules all violated antitrust laws
(Wolohan, 1999).
In other cases following these ones, the courts seemed to change their opinion and
began to narrow the extent of the exemption. In the case of Piazza v. Major League
Baseball, the owner of the San Francisco Giants attempted to sell the team in 1992 to
Vincent Piazza and Vincent Tirendi, who would relocate the Giants to Tampa Bay,
Florida. The National League President, Bill White, along with the Ownership
Committee for MLB prevented the move and provided the Giants owner, Robert Lurie,
with an alternative buyer who offered $15 million less than Piazza and Tirendi were
offering. The district court determined that the Flood ruling was limited to the reserve
system, not the purchase, sale, and relocation of baseball teams which was being
evaluated in this case. The case never reached its 1993 trial date as MLB reportedly
settled with Piazza and Tirendi for $6 million (Wolohan, 1999).
But MLB’s actions prompted other lawsuits including Butterworth v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs in 1993, where the court upheld the initial opinion
and interpretation found in the Piazza case, remarking that it defied normal reason for
baseball to have that broad of an antitrust exemption while other professional sports did
not (Champion, 2009). Other cases, such as Postema v. National League of Professional
Baseball in 1993 and Morsani v. Major League Baseball in 1999, came to the same
conclusion as in Butterworth that baseball’s antitrust exemption was limited to the
reserve clause system. But the courts were not completely unified on this interpretation,
as the ruling in McCoy v. Major League Baseball in 1995 stated that according to the
opinions in the Supreme Court Trilogy the exemption was intended to encompass all of
baseball (Wolohan, 1999).
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Influence of Collective Bargaining on the Reserve System
Since legislation and the courts failed to free MLB players from the constraints of
the unfair labor practices within MLB, it was now left to the players themselves to
overcome these obstacles (Abrams, 1999; Hylton, 1999). The majority of changes in
baseball regarding unfair labor practices such as the reserve clause system came not
through the courts, but rather as a result of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. In
the case of baseball, the act provided the means for unionized players to negotiate
agreements with their employers, which would be MLB and its teams. The statute forces
both parties to negotiate in ‘good faith’, meaning with the intent to reach an agreement,
although not mandating that they actually reach one. The courts then included in the
act’s list of mandatory bargaining subjects all the ways in which free agency systems in
professional sports are regulated (Bautista, 2000).
The players took advantage of this new outlet for their requests to be recognized
when in 1954 they formed the Major League Baseball Players’ Association (MLBPA). It
was initially fostered into existence by MLB to provide the players a way in which they
could communicate with the owners, with the intent of preventing the players from
forming a union. This communication system allowed the players to present requests to
the owners, who still controlled whatever changes would be made in a one-sided manner
(Bautista, 2000). Then in 1966 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which was
responsible for overseeing the collective bargaining process, granted the MLBPA
certification as a union under the NLRA. This allowed the MLBPA to begin negotiating
with MLB regarding labor restrictions including the reserve clause (Hoffman, 1969;
Gallant & Staudohar, 2003).
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What really took the organization from being a society of players to a powerful
acting union was the transformation of the MLBPA in the late 1960s by Marvin Miller,
the director of the union (Abrams, 1999). Miller was known for his bargaining resume
and his ability to improve salaries and working conditions for those he represented. In
1969, at the same time that Miller was hired, the NLRB acknowledged that since MLB
was interstate commerce, it would be under the NLRB’s supervision while also subject to
the stipulations of the NLRA. This was a very important breakthrough for the players
because it allowed them to not only unionize and collectively bargain with MLB, but also
to enjoy protection from unfair labor practices in a way that could not be affected by
baseball’s antitrust exemption (Bautista, 2000).
The reserve clause system was initially restrained after an allowance for an
independent arbitrator to hear salary disputes from players was included in the 1973
MLB collective bargaining agreement, or CBA (Bautista, 2000; Gallant & Staudohar,
2003). In 1976, the players used a salary dispute to challenge the reserve clause system.
The MLBPA brought the case before the chosen arbitrator, Peter Seitz, claiming that the
reserve clause in a player’s contract should only be binding for the first year following
the contract’s expiration. The owners argued that the clause could be interpreted to allow
a team to renew a player’s contract perpetually. But Seitz determined that such a right
could not be construed from the text of the clause (Bautista, 2000). He also declared that,
apart from an express contractual agreement between a player and a team, players could
not be subjected to a reserve clause as it was described in the current MLB rules.
According to Seitz’s interpretation, such a reserve system could however be a legitimate
part of MLB if it was specifically included in a CBA upon which both parties agreed
(Gilroy & Madden, 1977).
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This ruling initiated free agency in baseball, despite objections by the owners and
their attempts to have the decision overruled in courts. The courts had already been in
the practice of protecting anything found in a CBA that resulted from bargaining in ‘good
faith’ from antitrust lawsuits, and MLB’s agreed upon arbitration process was not
excluded. This protection of CBAs is commonly known as the ‘non-statutory labor
exemption’ and continues to prevent the actions of labor unions, including strikes, from
being prohibited by antitrust laws (Gallant & Staudohar, 2003). In the time following
this influential change in MLB, the players were able to remove the effects of the owner’s
monopoly of baseball on players’ employment, much to the same ends that antitrust laws
would have done (Abrams, 1999). Although the collective bargaining process has better
equalized the power between the MLB and the MLBPA, the relationship between the
owners and players has frequently been contentious and involved work stoppages
(Bautista, 2000).
After the players went on strike during the 1985 season over a disagreement about
whether or not to include a salary cap or revenue sharing system in the new CBA, the
owners decided together to try to curb the quickly escalating player salaries by agreeing
amongst themselves not to sign any free agents. Donald Fehr, the MLBPA president who
succeeded Marvin Miller, argued in an arbitration grievance that the MLB owners had
colluded together in an unfair labor practice. The arbitrators agreed with the MLBPA in
1990 and awarded the players monetary compensation. The relationship between the
owners and players would not get better for a long time and the owners frequently
participated in bad faith practices in order to combat the loss of control they were
experiencing. Positive steps were taken such as the 1990 collective bargaining session
which, following a lockout by the owners, resulted in a new CBA and a new
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understanding by both parties of the necessity of approaching the table in good faith
(Bautista, 2000).
However, in 1994, one year after the 1990 CBA expired, both parties had been
bargaining for about two years without reaching a new agreement. The players decided
to strike in July of 1994 and the owners reacted by cancelling the entire season, including
the World Series. Both parties accused the other of not bargaining in good faith and the
situation escalated to the point that President Clinton intervened, causing a federal court
to pass an injunction forcing baseball games to be continued under the rules of the 1990
CBA while the owners and players continued negotiations. After four years of
negotiations, they finally reached an agreement that was to last until the year 2000.
These situations were evidence of an increasingly bitter environment where owners and
players in baseball acted in regards to their own interests, rather than working together
for the good of the game (Bautista, 2000).
The Curt Flood Act of 1998
The Curt Flood Act serves as the most recent step in equalizing the power
between players and owners in labor relations. Following the troublesome 1995 season,
senators in Utah, Vermont, South Carolina, and New York decided to introduce a new
bill called ‘The Curt Flood Act’ to address the need for antitrust regulations in baseball
(Bautista, 2000). The bill was introduced in 1997 and when MLB and the MLBPA heard
of it, they both agreed during collective bargaining gatherings to cooperate in supporting
and promoting the legislation (Bautista, 2000). With the approval of professional
baseball, the senators added an amendment and then submitted it for the Judiciary
committee to approve in 1997. In 1998, over seventy-five years after the Federal
Baseball case had initially provided the antitrust exemption, the House of Representatives
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as well as the Senate passed the Curt Flood Act, and then the President signed it into law
(Bautista, 2000; Edmonds, 1999).
The Curt Flood Act’s stated purpose is to provide professional major league
baseball players with coverage under antitrust laws and “the same rights under the
antitrust laws as do other professional athletes” (Curt Flood Act, 1998, sec. 2). The act
amends the Clayton Act by including a new section at the end of it describing exactly in
what ways antitrust laws apply to MLB (Bautsta, 2000). The first aspect of this
description is that it does not apply to the minor leagues, the first-year player draft
system, the Professional Baseball Agreement between major and minor league baseball
teams, or any other form of baseball besides MLB (Curt Flood Act, 1998; Hylton, 1999).
To combat the long history of misinterpretations regarding which areas the antitrust laws
apply, the act contains specific descriptions of what should not be subjected to antitrust
laws. These areas include the business of baseball as it relates to franchise expansion,
location and relocation, ownership transfers, marketing and sales, licensing, and the
relationships between the Commissioner and the owners as well as employers and
employees including umpires. The act also gives a detailed definition of who qualifies as
a major league baseball player. But the most important part of the act is that it declares
the business of baseball and all of the actions of the persons in MLB related to the
employment of MLB players to be subject to antitrust laws as they would be in any other
professional sport involved in interstate commerce (Curt Flood Act, 1998). This means
that only the actions by MLB associated with player relations, including things such as a
salary cap and the reserve clause system, would be under antitrust scrutiny according to
the act (Wolohan, 1999).
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Just before the act was passed, members of Congress made a few remarks about
the bill which are noteworthy. Representative Henry Hyde said that the act serves as a
historical breakthrough where baseball players, owners, and the minor leagues all agreed
on how to apply antitrust laws to the business of baseball. He also argued that given the
tumultuous past of these parties, Congress needed to realize the importance of passing
this bill. According to Hyde, the legislation needed to be extremely narrow so that the
current successful state of collective bargaining in baseball would not be affected. He
noted that the bill was specifically written so that only a limited portion of the antitrust
exemption would be removed, leaving the rest of it intact. Other speakers, including Jim
Bunning, a US representative from Kentucky as well as a member of the Baseball Hall of
Fame and former member of the MLBPA Executive Board, agreed that although the act’s
scope was very limited and did not completely remove the antitrust exemption, it was a
good first step (Edmonds, 1999).
Impact of the Curt Flood Act
Early opinions about the effect of the Curt Flood Act agreed that instead of
removing baseball’s antitrust exemption, it in effect strengthened it (Wolohan, 1999).
Critics pointed to the potential hindrances as well as the extremely narrow application of
the act as reasons for this opinion (Edmonds, 1999; Grow, 2009). Since the act does not
apply to any players besides those in major league baseball, it leaves much of the
business of baseball under the old antitrust exemption (Mathewson, 1999; Hylton, 1999).
This is in contrast to the court cases that followed Flood v. Kuhn, which had been in the
habit of ruling that only baseball’s reserve system was under the antitrust exemption
(Mathewson, 1999). By intentionally narrowing the scope of the act, Congress
effectively left the rest of baseball exempt from antitrust laws (Hylton, 1999).
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However, some have argued that leaving a portion of the antitrust exemption
untouched actually helps prevent baseball from being a monopoly, since that would allow
Congress to better direct the actions of Major League Baseball owners towards
precompetitive ends. With a weapon such as the threat of completely removing MLB’s
antitrust exemption, Congress is able to influence the owners’ decisions, especially
regarding the league’s expansion and the movement of its franchises (Grow, 2012). But
this influence was used in other areas besides just the growth of the league. In the mid2000s, Congress was also able to use this threat to encourage MLB to implement stricter
PED testing standards and policies for its players (Grow, 2012). Once the exemption is
fully removed, Congress will not only lose this power, but will also have no leverage
with which to pressure the owners into implementing good labor practices (Grow, 2012).
Another reason that the Curt Flood Act does not present a legitimate threat to the
antitrust exemption is that the requirements for a player to file a successful antitrust
lawsuit under the act are complicated and rigorous (Matzura, 2009). A part of these
restrictions is that only current MLB players are protected under the act and furthermore
the act only applies to league actions that affect those players’ employment (Edmonds,
1999). Another way in which the act was intentionally limited was in regards to what is
known as the non-statutory labor exemption. This exemption allows collective
bargaining and federal labor laws to supersede any antitrust claims from employees or
employers. The reason this exemption was put in place was because collective action
such as strikes and lockouts by a union or management could potentially be regarded as
impeding commerce in the business’s market (Edmonds, 1999).
In an attempt to protect labor unions from federal injunctions, Congress passed a
statute which declared unions to be legal groupings that did not restrain trade. This law
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was not very effective in the courts since in a case shortly following the legislation,
strikes were ruled to be in violation of antitrust laws, using a limited interpretation of that
statutory exemption of labor law to justify the decision. In other cases, the legislation did
not protect actions by a union that were done for the interests of other parties, such as
other labor unions, nor those that involved a conspiracy between employees and
employers to manipulate the labor environment beyond what was necessary for the
purposes of bargaining (Edmonds, 1999).
Then, in 1976 in the case of Mackey v. National Football League, the court of
appeals removed the confusion and established what is known as the three-prong test
used to apply the non-statutory labor exemption. The first part states that any action
where a restraint on trade only affects the parties involved in collective bargaining is to
be protected under the exemption. Secondly, the only kinds of agreements that can be
exempt are those concerning mandatory bargaining items, as determined by the NLRA.
Lastly, the exemption can only apply to agreements that have been reached by genuine
arm’s-length bargaining (Edmonds, 1999; Matzura, 2009).
Since the non-statutory labor exemption was enacted and clarified, both unions
and management groups have learned that anything agreed upon in a collective
bargaining situation is protected from antitrust laws. Because of this, the players’ union
in a professional sport must be decertified in order for topics discussed in collective
bargaining negotiations to be brought to court in an antitrust lawsuit. This decertification
process is difficult and time-consuming, which may deter the MLBPA from attempting to
file a lawsuit under this act. However, there have been some examples of successful
sports union decertification. In 1987, directly following the strike by the National
Football League Players Association, a group of players successfully filed an antitrust
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lawsuit against the NFL apart from their union and passed the Mackey three-prong test in
court. But this did not occur until the players became desperate as the season was played
without them and replacement players were used on the field (Edmonds, 1999).
A final proposed reason that the Curt Flood Act might be damaging to the
relationship between MLB players and owners is that allowing MLB players to be
protected under antitrust laws will subvert the collective bargaining process. This is a
possibility since the opportunity to get out of an impasse by means of a lawsuit is a
tempting alternative to the difficult task of working through the issues at the bargaining
table. With the option of an antitrust lawsuit, both players and owners will have little
reason to offer real compromises and the negotiations will end up with the parties putting
up fronts instead of bargaining. Based on what has happened in other sports, researchers
predict that if baseball players were to file antitrust lawsuits as individuals every time that
they do not achieve their desired results, then labor solidarity among the players would be
destroyed. One last point is that once antitrust lawsuits are used, they tend to be relied
upon more and more often instead of negotiating (LeRoy, 2012).
Other researchers predicted that the Curt Flood Act would not have much of an
effect on labor relations in Major League Baseball (Grow, 2009; Curtis, 1999). Because
it contains so many limitations on what areas antitrust laws apply to baseball, the Curt
Flood Act does not affect most of the business of baseball. Although it is possible that
the act will help change some things in labor relations, it is unlikely that its influence will
be dramatic or that it will serve as the final part of baseball’s antitrust exemption story
(Curtis, 1999). Since both baseball owners and players were pushing for the act to be
passed, it can be inferred that its purpose was merely as a symbol rather than a catalyst
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for change (Abrams, 1999). The cooperation by both parties also could be simply a sign
of their eagerness to repair their previously hostile relationship (Curtis, 1999).
The employment changes due to the collective bargaining and arbitration process,
combined with the players’ increase in bargaining power, may have made the Curt Flood
Act altogether irrelevant (Grow, 2012; Mann, 2012). By the time that the act was passed,
free agency, which was one of the main goals of removing baseball’s antitrust exemption,
was already common practice (Hylton, 1999; Mathewson, 1999). The act can be seen as
only a symbolic reaction to Curt Flood and his revolutionary actions, and not intending to
change the situations which he was revolting against. Also, the act was long overdue,
coming after Curt Flood and many of his peers had not only left baseball but had also
passed away, so the act only benefits current players who are no longer facing the same
difficulties that originally necessitated this act (Hylton, 1999; Mathewson, 1999).
However, some have pointed out that the progress in removing unfair labor practices
could be halted or even reversed through collective bargaining in the same way in which
it was achieved (McGettigan, 1999).
Other evidence challenging the act’s necessity includes that there has not yet been
a MLB player who has filed a lawsuit under the Curt Flood Act nor has there been any
attempt to decertify the MLBPA in preparation for such a lawsuit (Grow, 2009). Also,
due to the complicated measures needed to successfully file a lawsuit under the act
(including decertifying the union and halting the collective bargaining process), the value
of antitrust action under the Curt Flood Act may be so small that it is only used as a last
resort rather than a legitimate option (Edmonds, 1999).
Despite these views, recently there have been noticeable, positive effects of the
Curt Flood Act on labor negotiations between players and owners (Grow, 2009). The
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valid threat of antitrust action by major league baseball players was predicted to instigate
otherwise reluctant owners to participate in good faith collective bargaining (Bautista,
2000). Evidence of this has been seen since the Curt Flood Act and its threat of antitrust
action have forced the MLB owners to approach collective bargaining with the MLBPA
more cautiously. In the three most recent negotiations, MLB has tried to impose policies
such as a salary cap on the MLBPA and even attempted to force the cap on players’
salaries during an impasse, at which point the NLRB had to intervene. But in the
negotiations for the 2002 CBA, the owners did not even bring up the issue of a salary cap
for the first time in over twenty years. The owners also made a promise that they would
not attempt to unilaterally impress any policies on the MLBPA in the future. Prior to the
act, MLB had experienced five collective bargaining situations in twenty-four years that
had all been contentious and resulted in eight work stoppages in that period of time
(Grow, 2009).
Although the decertification of the MLBPA would be required and although it has
not yet been attempted, the opportunity for the players to file a lawsuit, which was not
previously available, is now present. It is highly unlikely that one of the most clever and
astute unions in professional sports would have lobbied so much for an act that would
prove useless. This threat is even more valid in light of the fact that unions in other
professional sports leagues, including the National Football League and the National
Basketball Association, have successfully used decertification to either file a lawsuit or
compel owners to negotiate in good faith (Grow, 2009).
Some would argue that recent peaceful negotiations have resulted from other
factors such as the financial success of the league and the unwillingness of both parties to
hurt the league with another work stoppage (Grow, 2009; Staudohar, 2003). However,
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neither of these reasons are enough to support the drastic change in the collective
bargaining atmosphere for MLB. It is not a coincidence that the current state of peaceful
negotiations, including reaching two consecutive collective bargaining agreements
without labor stoppages, has occurred since the enactment of the Curt Flood Act. The
same critics who argued that the Curt Flood Act would have no effect also predicted that
the strife between MLB owners and players would continue, which has not been true.
This is not to say that the Curt Flood Act was the only reason that negotiations have gone
so well in MLB recently. But as Steven Fehr, an outside counsel for the MLBPA,
pointed out, the Curt Flood Act provides a positive effect on the environment of MLB’s
collective bargaining negotiations (Grow, 2009).
Conclusion
Throughout the years, MLB’s antitrust exemption has been supported, analyzed,
criticized, and defended by anyone who had an opinion and the ability to make it known.
Although originally intended in the Federal Baseball case to allow for the business of
baseball to operate without interference according to its unique aspects, the ruling
eventually became outdated. MLB was no longer the small grouping of clubs that did not
foster business between states other than the players and teams travelling for games. The
business of baseball grew to accurately fit the description of interstate commerce, yet the
exemption stayed intact. The Supreme Court, who initially enacted the exemption,
passed the responsibility of fixing the situation to the legislature, who in turn went quiet
on the subject for over seventy-five years. It was not until after two more significant
court rulings, Toolson and Flood, as well as many other smaller cases, that the exemption
was partially lifted by the Curt Flood Act of 1998.
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Although the Curt Flood Act removed a portion of the antitrust exemption,
collective bargaining was more influential in removing the reserve clause and other unfair
labor practices. But it came with a cost, as the sudden equalizing of power between
owners and players caused disagreements and tension between the two parties, much of
which still lingers today. Many of these collective bargaining sessions have led to
harmful work stoppages that threatened baseball’s very existence. Once free agency
began, owners felt the financial burden of rising costs as they attempted to outbid other
teams for the best players. As contract salaries skyrocketed, the relationship between the
owners and players grew even more hostile, with both parties acting in their own best
interests, putting aside the well-being of the sport.
However, since the Curt Flood Act was passed into law, both the MLB and the
MLBPA have improved in their approaches at the bargaining table. There is optimism
that the recent peaceful negotiations are going to become regular occurrences in the
future, now that the players are protected under the Curt Flood Act. But researchers are
aware that there are many factors involved in the relationship between the owners and the
players, making it difficult to attribute all of the positive steps in collective bargaining to
the influence of the Curt Flood Act.
Other opinions have pointed out that the act’s constraints leave much of the
business of baseball still exempt from antitrust laws. The Curt Flood Act may turn out to
be inconsequential because of the arduous process required to decertify the MLBPA
before bringing a lawsuit to court. It is still unclear if the act was in actuality a symbolic
way to honor a great baseball player, with no intended impact on the present day
relationship between MLB owners and players. There is still much more research to be
done and evidence to be examined once MLB players have had more opportunities to
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bring their disputes with owners to court under antitrust law. Whether or not the case for
baseball’s antitrust exemption has finally been settled still remains to be seen.
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